创始股东保护问题研究——国美股权与控制权之争对中国公司治理的启示

国美虽在英属维尔京群岛注册，在香港交易及结算所有限公司上市，但仍不失为一家典型的中国式家族企业。国关事件展示了一个失衡的公司治理架构，即管理层可在两权分离的立法模式下实现内部人控制，风险投资人可通过议定投资协议来约束管理层，但创始股东则因受制于一股一权的强制性规范而容易失去对公司的控制权。为维护其创业诉求，建议创始股东除传统控股，还应特别设计公司章程来预留特定董事席位，并约定优先股等保护条款。

On Protection of Founder Shareholders Inspiration from GOME Fighting Control Case to China＇s Corporate Governance

GOME is registered in the British Virgin Islands, gets listed in Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, and still remains a typical Chinese-style family firm. GOME fighting-control case reveals an unbalanced corporate governance structure, i.e. the management can exercise insider control as a result of the separation of ownership and management, and the venture capitalists can negotiate a term sheet to bind the management. But the founder shareholders are restricted by the compulsory rule of “one share, one vote”, ready to lose the controlling position. In order to maintain their “built to last” claim, the founders are advised, apart from sticking to the controlling tradition via share channel, to reserve the director vacancies and to invent certain preferred stock by calculatedly devising the Articles of Association.