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CEO Turnover and Ownership Structure: Evidence From the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry
Authors:Enya He  David W Sommer
Institution:1. Enya He is an Assistant Professor in the College of Business at University of North Texas;2. David W. Sommer is the Charles E. Cheever Chair of Risk Management in the Bill Greehey School of Business at St. Mary's University. The authors can be contacted via e‐mail: enyahe@unt.edu and dsommer@stmarytx.edu.
Abstract:This article examines the impact of ownership structure on the relation between firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in the U.S. property–liability insurance industry. Theoretical implications of stock versus mutual ownership structures on the performance–turnover relation are ambiguous. Our empirical results indicate that CEO turnover is less responsive to firm underwriting performance in mutual insurers compared to stock insurers. In fact, we find that while CEO turnover for stock firms is negatively related to prior performance, no such relationship is found for mutual insurers. These results hold while controlling for board structure and other relevant factors.
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