Bids as a Vehicle of (Mis)Information: Collusion in English Auctions with Affiliated Values |
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Authors: | Marco Pagnozzi |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics and CSEF, Università di Napoli Federico II, Via Cintia (Monte S. Angelo), 80126 Napoli, Italy;2. pagnozzi@unina.it |
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Abstract: | In an English auction, a bidder’s strategy depends on the prices at which his competitors drop out, because these convey information on the value of the object on sale. A ring of colluding bidders can strategically manipulate the information transmitted through its members’ bids, in order to mislead other bidders into bidding less aggressively and thus allow a designated bidder to bid more aggressively. Collusion increases the probability that the ring wins the auction and reduces the price it pays. The presence of a ring harms other bidders (as well as the seller) and reduces efficiency. |
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