How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis |
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Authors: | Helge Berger Ulrich Woitek |
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Institution: | aPrinceton University, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton, NJ 05544-1013, USA;bUniversity of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK |
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Abstract: | Recent research has found inconclusive evidence regarding the presence of opportunistic political business cycles in German data. Inferring from Vaubel, 1993 and Vaubel, 1997one could argue, however, that at least in the case of monetary policy the results are seriously flawed from the onset, because an independent central bank such as the German Bundesbank will support the government only when it shares its partisan views. Vaubel has not presented parametric empirical evidence in support of his hypothesis. We show that the application of time series analysis yields results that clearly run counter to the hypothesis. Evidence on voting behaviour from the central bank council minutes points in the same direction. It appears perhaps paradoxically that an opportunistic government is better off facing an ideologically opposing Bundesbank council majority than a supportive one before elections. |
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Keywords: | Political business cycles Central bank Bundesbank |
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