环保督察与企业信息披露——来自上市公司的证据

对于经济活动监管的效能取决于监管者能否获得充分的信息。文章研究中央政府的环保督察如何影响企业的负面信息披露。借鉴公司金融领域经典文献，文章利用股价数据构造了上市公司的负面信息披露指标。利用双重差分分析，研究发现受到环保督察影响省份的上市公司相对于未受督察影响的公司显著减少了信息披露，而公司财务指标则不受环保督察的显著影响。与地方政府具有政治联系的公司在督察期间更加显著地减少了信息披露。上述结果表明，环保部门、地方政府、企业和金融市场监管者之间的联动机制是决定监管政策有效性的一个重要维度。

Environmental Protection Inspection and Information Disclosure: Evidence from Listed Firms in China

The effectiveness of the government oversight over economic activities depends on the quality of disclosed information. This paper studies how the environmental protection inspections in China affect the negative information disclosure of listed companies. Drawing on the classic literature of corporate finance, this paper employs the third-order moment of stock data to construct corporate negative information disclosure indicators. Using a difference-in-difference estimation, the study finds that listed companies in provinces exposed to environmental inspections significantly reduced information disclosure compared to listed companies that were not exposed to inspections. At the same time, the financial indicators of listed companies are not significantly affected by environmental inspections. Listed companies with political connections to local governments significantly reduced information disclosure during their inspections.These results attest to the importance of understanding the interaction among environmental regulator, information disclosure, local governments, and the financial regulator.