Rogues and Deviants: a game-theoretic perspective on opportunism in strategic alliances |
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| Authors: | Anton P Fenik Charles H Noble Kevin Lehnert |
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| Institution: | 1. Marketing, Seidman College of Business, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI, USAfenika@gvsu.edu;3. Henry Professor of Business, Associate Dean for Research &4. Faculty, Haslam College of Business, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA;5. Marketing, Seidman College of Business, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI, USA |
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| Abstract: | ABSTRACTThis research examines how relational factors, such as monitoring, relative alliance identity (RAI), and trust, influence opportunism and, consequently, alliance performance. The authors suggest that the strategic alliances literature would benefit from recognising that opportunism does not always originate from the firm (rogue opportunism), but can also originate from individual employees (deviant opportunism). Hypotheses are tested in a multi-method approach within a business simulation and a cross-sectional sample of alliance executives. The results demonstrate a U-shaped relationship between trust and opportunism; however, monitoring moderates the relationship such that at high levels of trust, opportunism is practically non-existent. Further, results indicate that employees’ identification with the alliance impedes opportunism. Additionally, both types of opportunistic behaviours negatively impact the performance of partner firms and alliances. |
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| Keywords: | Strategic alliances opportunism relational factors game theory |
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