| 假冒行为的博弈分析与政策取向 |
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| 引用本文： | 李云峰,夏海涛.假冒行为的博弈分析与政策取向[J].重庆商学院学报,2003(5):49-51,65. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李云峰 夏海涛 |
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| 作者单位： | 新疆财经学院金融系，新疆乌鲁木齐830002 |
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| 摘 要： | 假冒行为源于经济个体对利益的不正当追求。如没有有效的约束，假冒行为会在整个社会中蔓延。本文从建立博弈模型出发．分析了不同的经济约束对假冒行为的影响，最后对政策制定提供相应的理论依据。
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| 关 键 词： | 假冒产品 博弈分析 纳什均衡 资源配置 中国 创新 市场监管 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-6439(2003)05-0049-03 |
Game analysis and policy study on counterfeit behavior |
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| LI Yun-feng,Xia Hai-tao.Game analysis and policy study on counterfeit behavior[J].Journal of Chongqing Institute of Commerce,2003(5):49-51,65. |
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| Authors: | LI Yun-feng Xia Hai-tao |
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| Abstract: | Counterfeit behavior comes from economic individuals' pursuit of unlawful profit. Without effective restriction, counterfeit behavior can spread in the society. Based on establishment of game model, this paper analyzes the influence of different economic restrictions on counterfeit behavior and provides related theoretical analysis for making policy. |
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| Keywords: | game Nash Equilibrium counterfeit behavior |
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