基于绩效评价的员工激励研究

当前,人力资源管理的战略导向性愈益明显。由于人的复杂性、社会分工的加深和交易的频繁性,激励机制设计一直是信息经济学和人力资源管理实践关注的重要问题。本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,逐步释放假设,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励的选择。研究结论认为,企业在实践中要综合考虑客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价的结果来设计激励制度,正式契约可以通过前者来降低由关系契约产生的额外激励成本和违约风险,关系契约则通过后者减少正式契约产生的激励扭曲问题。

Research on Performance Appraisal Based Staff Incentives

Presently, the strategic leading role played by human resource management becomes more and more distinctive compared with conventional personnel management among the operating functions of enterprise. The design of incentive mechanism is always an important issue to which information economics, as well as the practice of HRM pays attention because of human's complexity, social division of labor deepened and frequency of transaction. As releasing the hypothesis gradually, this article adopts the classical Agent Model in order to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively. This conclusion drawn by this article is that, to design the incentive mechanism, the enterprise should integrate results of the objective performance appraisal with the subjective performance appraisal. Thus, the relational contract can reduce distortionary incentives would be created by the formal contract, while the formal contract may reduce the extra cost and risk of temptation to renege produced by the relational contract.