Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner 's Dilemma Game |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3C5;2. Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, N1G 2W1;1. Department of Physics and Astronomy, Seoul National University, Seoul 08826, Republic of Korea;2. Department of Physics, Pukyong National University, Busan 48513, Republic of Korea;3. School of Economics and Trade, Kyungpook National University, Daegu 41566, Republic of Korea;1. UCLA Anderson School of Management, United States;2. Department of Economics, Boston College, United States;3. Warwick Business School, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | The dynamic evolutionary stability of mutual defection is proven for the repeated prisoner 's dilemma game where payoffs are cumulative and the number of repetitions is known. This agrees with the classical result that the only Nash equilibrium outcome is to defect at all stages of this repeated game. Moreover, it is shown that, for any initial polymorphic population, the evolutionary dynamic converges to a unique Nash equilibrium strategy that depends on the original polymorphism. Both these results confirm earlier conjectures concerning the application of evolutionary game theory to the repeated prisoner 's dilemma.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C72. |
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