首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Complements and substitutes in common agency
Institution:1. Greqam, Université de la Méditérranée, Chateau Lafarge, Route des Milles, Les Milles, 13290, France;2. Greqam, Université de la Méditérranée and Institut Universitaire de France, Chateau Lafarge, Route des Milles, Les Milles, 13290, France;1. College of Chemistry, Chemical Engineering and Environment, Minnan Normal University, Zhangzhou, 363000, China;2. Pingtan Environmental Monitoring Center of Fujian, Pingtan, 350400, China;3. Putian Institute of Biological Engineering, Putian, 351100, China;4. Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Area Meteorological Bureau, Pingtan, 350400, China;5. Fujian Provincial Key Laboratory of Modern Analytical Science and Separation Technology, Minnan Normal University, Zhangzhou, 363000, China;6. Fujian Province University Key Laboratory of Pollution Monitoring and Control, Minnan Normal University, Zhangzhou, 363000, China
Abstract:In this paper we analyse the problem of the rent obtained by the agent in private common agency games. The key features for answering this question are the properties of the cost function of the agent. We prove that if this cost function is submodular (costs complements) then there is no equilibrium in which the agent makes a rent and if the cost function is supermodular (costs substitutes) then in all equilibria the agent makes a rent. We also examine the problem in some intermediate cases.
Keywords:
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号