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CEO职业关注与企业会计信息披露质量
引用本文:李维,李海奇,黄宇漩,何恭政.CEO职业关注与企业会计信息披露质量[J].财经理论与实践,2021,42(6):96-102.
作者姓名:李维  李海奇  黄宇漩  何恭政
作者单位:湖南大学 金融与统计学院,湖南 长沙 410079;广东财经大学 金融学院,广东 广州 510399
摘    要:依据2001-2019年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,以C EO年龄水平作为职业关注水平的代理变量,考量CEO职业关注对企业会计信息披露质量的影响.结果表明:CEO职业关注降低了企业的会计信息披露质量,CEO职业关注水平较高时,企业盈余管理倾向更强,应计质量更差,发生盈余粉饰的可能性更高.进一步分析发现,企业正向盈余管理倾向是C EO职业关注影响会计信息披露质量的渠道,职业关注与会计信息披露质量的关系受到财务业绩压力的干扰.

关 键 词:CEO年龄  职业关注  会计信息披露质量

CEO Career Concern and Corporate Accounting Information Quality
LI Wei,LI Haiqi,HUANG Yuxuan,HO Kungcheng.CEO Career Concern and Corporate Accounting Information Quality[J].The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics,2021,42(6):96-102.
Authors:LI Wei  LI Haiqi  HUANG Yuxuan  HO Kungcheng
Abstract:Using listed firms from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share during year 2001-2019, we investigates the effect of CEO career concern on corporate accounting information quality. The empirical results show a negative relationship between CEO age and accounting information quality. Specifically, higher-level of CEO career concern leading to both an increased likelihood of greater earnings management and financial window dressing. Also, we test the impact of CEO career concern on earnings management in different directions, and the finding shows that CEO career concern only affect positive earning managements. Further analysis shows that the positive earnings management tendency of enterprises is the channel for CEO professional attention to affect the quality of accounting information disclosure, and the relationship between professional attention and the quality of accounting information disclosure is disturbed by financial performance pressure.
Keywords:CEO age  CEO career concern  accounting information quality
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