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The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement
Authors:Fiammetta Gordon  David Squires
Affiliation:(1) Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Fleetbank House, 2-6 Salisbury Square, London, EC4Y 8JX, UK;(2) Deloitte, Athene Place, 66 Shoe Lane, London, EC4A 3BQ, UK
Abstract:Summary  The paper briefly reviews previous studies of the deterrent effect of competition enforcement. It then describes the key findings of a recent report commissioned by the Office of Fair Trading on the scale of the deterrent effect of merger control and competition law enforcement in the UK. The research, which was based on in-depth interviews and phone surveys with senior competition lawyers and large UK companies also indicated which sanctions may be more effective at deterring anti-competitive behaviour and provided suggestions for improving deterrence. The paper discusses a number of policy issues raised by the research’s findings. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the OFT or Deloitte. This paper was prepared for the October 2007 workshop on Measuring the Effects of Competition Law Enforcement, organized by the Netherlands Competition Authority.
Keywords:competition enforcement  consumer savings  deterrent effect  merger control
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