不对称信息、偏好搜寻与流通机制

在稳定性偏好、理性与均衡假设下,基于欧几里德确定性空间,人类的交换行为可以简化为简单的需求-供给耦合问题,但现实世界商品交易过程存在着复杂的结构。通过将交易过程中"需要的双重一致性"耦合问题模型化,本文构建了流通机制概念模型,分析了它的三大特征:交易双方的偏好结构以及了解这种结构的交易成本、处理这种偏好信息的过程以及交易实现、保障交易有效实施的制度环境。流通机制下任何个体行为的理性均衡等价于激励相容的协调机制,这一机制的内在结构可以表现为业态及生产-流通-消费的动态反馈,流通机制与生产、消费两侧的结合界面通过威廉姆森的交易费用分析框架确定。本文通过一个典型的镶嵌在特定社会结构中、政府主导型产业发展模式的实例,考察了流通机制的生产知识、需求知识与信息配置特征,印证了流通机制作为一种中心化机制的重要意义及政策含义。

Asymmetric Information, Preference-Seeking and the Mechanism of Distribution and Retailing

Under the assumptions of stable preference,rationality and equilibrium,human being’s exchange behavior is theoretically simplified as coupling of demand and supply in Euclidean space.However,real transaction processes have complicated structures.This paper models the problem of double coincidence of needs and constructs a conceptual model of distribution and retailing mechanism.The Mechanism has three attributes: trader’s preference structure that needs transaction cost to learn the details,process to deal with the preference information and realize the transaction,and institutional environment to enforce these transactions.Mechanism with any equilibrium of rational individuals is incentively compatible.The mechanism’s inherent structure is retail formats and dynamics of production,distribution and consumption,whose interfaces can be defined by Williamson’s governance analysis framework.Though an example embedded in a specific social structure and with government dominated development character,this paper analyses the mechanism’s attributes of knowledge and information allocation which have some clearly policy implications.