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Learning by trial and error
Authors:H Peyton Young  
Institution:aUniversity of Oxford, Oxford, UK;bThe Brookings Institution, Washington DC, USA
Abstract:A person learns by trial and error if he occasionally tries out new strategies, rejecting choices that are erroneous in the sense that they do not lead to higher payoffs. In a game, however, strategies can become erroneous due to a change of behavior by someone else. We introduce a learning rule in which behavior is conditional on whether a player experiences an error of the first or second type. This rule, called interactive trial and error learning, implements Nash equilibrium behavior in any game with generic payoffs and at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
Keywords:Learning  Adaptive dynamics  Nash equilibrium  Bounded rationality
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