Short‐Term Expectations in Listed Firms: The Effects Of Different Owner Types

We report empirical evidence in line with the disciplining role of different institutional and other owner types in reducing managerial myopia. Using data from a large Nordic survey, we find that companies, to a reasonably high degree, feel that external pressure for a good result in the short‐term generates conflict with the company's long‐term goals. We test for the effect of different ownership types and find that especially in firms with a large and non‐transitory activist or fund as an owner, the perceived pressure for short‐term actions is reduced. In addition, we observe a negative association between firm profitability and short‐term pressure, and we find that younger managers feel significantly more pressure. Firms subject to greater pressure engage in more actions to accommodate that pressure. Again, the impact of a large activist owner is especially beneficial because such firms significantly less often undertake actions that have the potential to destroy value, such as deprioritizing their long‐term investments or R&D.