Stability induced by “no-quibbling” |
| |
Authors: | Scott L. Feld Bernard Grofman |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of Sociology, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA;(2) School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA |
| |
Abstract: | We demonstrate the important consequence of one particular type of voter behavior: the “differentiation” (“no-quibbling”) constraint that alternatives too similar to the alternative which they might replace will not be considered. We find that imposition of a sufficient differentiation norm leads to stable outcomes of decision making in a spatial context. We also briefly consider the potential effects of other possible constraints on feasible choices, especially as these might synergistically interact with choices based on “no-quibbling.” |
| |
Keywords: | social choice equilibrium social norm spatial voting model no-quibbling |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|