Abstract: | Shareholder primacy is increasingly considered to be the mosteffective way to foster managerial (corporate) accountability.Contrary to this now standard argument, we consider that shareholderprimacy, rather than gatekeeper failure, is directly responsiblefor the multiplication of accounting irregularities and thedramatic increase in executive compensations. To defend thisthesis, we propose a new reading of Berle and Means (1932),Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), stressing thelogical failure of a control of the business firm provided forby stock markets: the implementation of shareholder primacyimplies a partial disconnection between access to internal knowledgeand empowerment. In turn, this disconnection favours deceptivebehaviours on the part of corporate insiders. Empirical evidencemostly based on Enron-era financial scandals illustrates ourargument. |