Enhancing managerial equity incentives with moving average payoffs |
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Authors: | Yisong S Tian |
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Institution: | Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada |
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Abstract: | Prior research suggests that Asian stock options provide stronger managerial equity incentives than traditional stock options do, holding the cost of the option grant constant. Although this is true on the grant date, it is not over the life of the option grant. Very little of the initial advantage remains after 2 years because Asian stock options have diminishing incentive effects over time. A simple solution is to replace averaging over the option's life with averaging over a moving window. We show that moving average options do not have the diminishing incentive problem and are effective in preventing managerial gaming. |
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Keywords: | Asian stock options executive stock options managerial equity incentives managerial gaming moving average stock price manipulation |
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