(Anti-)Competitive effect of joint bidding: evidence from ODA procurement auctions |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV, São Paulo, Brazil;2. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK;3. PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;4. PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;1. Maastricht University, Department of Organisation and Strategy, Netherlands;2. School of Economics and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom;3. Department of Business Economics & Public Policy, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19107, USA;4. Norwich Business School and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | Using auction data on Japanese ODA procurement, I empirically examined whether joint bidding has a pro- or anti-competitive effect, particularly for local firms. In auction theory, the joint bidding effect depends on theories. If joint bidding reduces barriers to entry for potential bidders with limited financial and technical resources, it is pro-competitive. When bidders exploit collusive schemes under cover of joint bidding, the anti-competitive effect is realized. By the OLS and treatment effect models, I found that joint bidding in general does not foster competition, but it has a competitive effect on local firms in developing countries. J. Japanese Int. Economies 18 (3) (2004) 416–439. |
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