合谋和风险投资合约设计的关系探讨

风险企业独特的所有权结构值得研究。给出了一个理论框架，在这个框架里，风险企业的控制权和现金流量权安排都得到了说明。在风险企业里，风险资本家的主要功能是监督。要保证监督的有效性，必须赋予其对风险企业的控制权。为了发挥其监督功能，风险投资合约必须防止合谋。

A Study on the Relation of Collusion and Contracts Designing in VC Investment

The ownership arrangement in the VC-backed firm is worth studying. This article describes a theoretical framework where the arrangement of the control power and the cash flow rights can all be explained. In the VC-backed firm, the main function of VCs is monitoring. In order to ensure the monitoring effectively, the control over the firm must be given to the VCs. For the monitoring function works, the VC investment contracts must be collusion-proof. To avoid a collusion, the incentive compatibility constraint of VCs must be improved.