On some alternative criteria for justice between generations |
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Authors: | Partha Dasgupta |
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Institution: | Stanford University, Stanford, U.S.A.;London School of Economics, London, England |
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Abstract: | This paper is concerned with Rawls' principle of just savings. Both the intergenerational maxi–min solution and the Nash equilibrium are analyzed in the context of a simple growth model and a specific preference structure. The results are compared to the Utilitarian solution. The maxi–min solution is intertemporally inconsistent and all the Nash equilibria are Pareto inefficient. The latter part of the paper analyzes intergenarational strong equilibria, the α-core and the β-core. It is shown that for the model in question the set of strong equilibria is empty, and that both the α- and β-cores are roughly speaking equal to the set of all Pareto efficient programmes of accumulation. |
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