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Entrepreneurship,Financiership, and Selection*
Authors:Tuomas Takalo  Otto Toivanen
Institution:1. Bank of Finland, FI‐00101 Helsinki, Finland tuomas.takalo@gmail.com;2. Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation, KU Leuven, Belgium otto.toivanen@econ.kuleuven.be
Abstract:We develop an equilibrium model of the market for entrepreneurial finance, in which all agents have some personal wealth and a project whose quality is their private information. All agents choose whether to invest either as entrepreneurs or financiers, or to invest in storage technology. We find that a binding economy‐level wealth constraint, which renders credit scarce, can create advantageous selection, where productive agents become entrepreneurs and unproductive agents become their financiers. If funding is easier to obtain, entrepreneurship also attracts unproductive agents. In our model, individual wealth and entrepreneurship are positively (negatively) correlated if financial market participation is complete (incomplete).
Keywords:Asymmetric information  credit constraints  entrepreneurial finance  financial market efficiency  start‐up creation  D53  D82  G14  G30  L26
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