Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot |
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Authors: | George Tridimas |
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Institution: | (1) School of Economics, University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, County Antrim, BT37 0QB, UK |
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Abstract: | Contrary to modern democracies ancient Athens appointed large numbers of government officers by lot. After describing the
Athenian arrangements, the paper reviews the literature on the choice between election and lot focusing on representativeness
of the population, distributive justice, minimization of conflicts, quality of appointees and administrative economy. It then
examines why in drawing up the constitution a self-interested citizen may give up voting for government officials and appoint
them by lot. It is shown that appointment by lot is preferred when the effort required to choose candidates is less than the
benefit expected from their actions as government officials. It is also found that, given the choice, office motivated candidates
may unanimously agree to selection by lot but not to election. |
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Keywords: | |
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