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跨国公司对外投资的博弈论分析
引用本文:程新章,胡峰. 跨国公司对外投资的博弈论分析[J]. 石家庄经济学院学报, 2003, 26(1): 29-32
作者姓名:程新章  胡峰
作者单位:华东师范大学,商学院,上海,200062
摘    要:跨国公司对外直接投资的方式有两种:新建投资和跨国并购。20世纪80年代以来,跨国并购占国外直接投资的比重日益提高。从博弈理论出发,阐释了新建投资和跨国并购之间的利润差别,结合波特的价值链模型,着重解释了服务业和大型制造业企业为什么会出现跨国并购。为跨国并购提供了一种理论上的解释。

关 键 词:跨国并购 新建投资 跨国公司 博弈
文章编号:1007-6875(2003)01-0029-04
修稿时间:2002-08-28

Comparative Analysis between Greenfield Investment and Cross - border Mergers: the Game Theory of Multinational Firms
CHENG Xin zhang,HU Feng. Comparative Analysis between Greenfield Investment and Cross - border Mergers: the Game Theory of Multinational Firms[J]. Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics, 2003, 26(1): 29-32
Authors:CHENG Xin zhang  HU Feng
Abstract:MNFs have two kinds of method to invest abroad: greenfield investment and cross-border mergers Cross-border mergers have greatly improved since 1980s From the point of game theory, this article explain the difference of profit between greenfield investment and cross-border mergers Linking with Porter's value-chain analysis, the reasons of why service industry and large-scale manufacture enterprises exist cross-border mergers are explained This may be a contribution of explaining cross-border mergers
Keywords:cross-border mergers  greenfield investment  MNFs  game theory  
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