| 风险科技企业产权博弈与控制权优化 |
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| 引用本文： | 王华. 风险科技企业产权博弈与控制权优化[J]. 华东经济管理, 2005, 19(6): 30-32 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王华 |
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| 作者单位： | 暨南大学,会计系,广东,广州,510632 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家软科学研究计划项目(2003DGQ1D110)《高新技术企业人力资本管理研究》阶段性研究成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章首先阐述了风险科技企业控制权的优化是风险资本家和创业企业家产权博弈的均衡解;然后利用推广的纳什谈判模型具体分析了风险资本家和创业企业家对控制权争夺的博弈过程;根据博弈过程得到风险科技企业控制权相机转移模式;最后讨论了控制权相机转移模式的实证证据和现实指
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| 关 键 词： | 风险科技企业 产权博弈 控制权优化 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-5097(2005)06-0030-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-03-21 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-03-21 |
Properties Game and Optimization of Control in VC-backed High-tech Firms |
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| WANG Hu,HUANG Zhi-jun. Properties Game and Optimization of Control in VC-backed High-tech Firms[J]. East China Economic Management, 2005, 19(6): 30-32 |
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| Authors: | WANG Hu HUANG Zhi-jun |
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| Affiliation: | Department of Accounting,Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632,China) |
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| Abstract: | Firstly, this article expatiates that the optimization of VC-backed firms' control is the equilibrium of properties game between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Then the article analyses the process of the control contest between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs with the game model. According to the the process of the controlling contest, it gets the control contingent delivery model. At last, the article discusses the empirical evidences and the practical significance. |
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| Keywords: | VC-backed high-tech firms properties game optimization of control right |
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