Decentralized Welfare: Will There Be Underprovision?

This paper develops an Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium model of welfare provision by states when the benefit payment is a local public good and a fixed population of welfare recipients distributes itself between states with logistic “migration” function. The model shows that state size is an important demand shifter across states because it alters the supply elasticity of recipients. The model provides estimates of how the degree of benefit under provision varies with this migration elasticity. Other demand instruments (such as taxpayer resources and “generosity”) likewise generate positive correlation between benefits and recipients, while supply shifters generate negative correlation between benefits and recipients. The model's predictions are closely matched empirically, when examining the reduced form impact of these instruments on the pattern of welfare benefits and recipients across states. Using these impacts to assign the instruments to either supply or demand sides of the model, it is possible to estimate the model's structural elasticities. These turn out to be high enough so that simulated solutions to the model generate considerable welfare underprovision and thus raise concern about a race to the bottom with decentralized control over AFDC.