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社会保障政策目标X-低效率分析:一个新的研究视角
引用本文:沈君彬.社会保障政策目标X-低效率分析:一个新的研究视角[J].石家庄经济学院学报,2011,34(2):86-91.
作者姓名:沈君彬
作者单位:东北财经大学研究生院,辽宁大连,116025;中共福建省委党校社会发展研究所,福建福州,350001
基金项目:福建省社会科学规划项目
摘    要:X-低效率分析是社会保障政策目标分析的一个新的研究视角。"漏桶理论"天然地诠释了社会保障X-低效率存在的原因,社会保障制度作为社会的稳定器和安全网,其政策效率目标在运作过程中会产生一定漏出量,引发X-低效率现象。政府失灵、制度设计管理缺陷、道德风险与负面激励共同构成了社会保障政策目标X-低效率的客观诱因。

关 键 词:社会保障  政策目标  X-低效率  奥肯漏桶  道德风险  负面激励

Analysis on X-inefficiencies of Goals of Social Security Strategy: a New Research Viewpoint
SHEN Jun-bin.Analysis on X-inefficiencies of Goals of Social Security Strategy: a New Research Viewpoint[J].Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics,2011,34(2):86-91.
Authors:SHEN Jun-bin
Institution:SHEN Jun-bin (1. Dongbei University of Finance and Economics ,Dalian,Liaoning 116025; 2. Party School of Fujian Provincial CPC Committee, Fuzhou, Fujian 350001 )
Abstract:Analysis on X-efficiency is a new research viewpoint for studying the goals of social security strategy. "Leaky bucket theory" naturally explains the existence of X-inefficiency in social security. As a social stabilizer and safety net, the strategy efficiency objective of social security system would have some leakage during its opera- tion, which could lead X-inefficiency. The government failure, the design and management flaws of the system, moral hazard and negative incentives also could lead social security system to X-inefficiency.
Keywords:social security  goals of strategy  X-inefficiency  Leaky Bucket Theory  moral hazard  negative incentive
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