| 动态博弈中的言语行为分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 沈洁,潘天群.动态博弈中的言语行为分析[J].天津商学院学报,2008,28(1):48-51. |
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| 作者姓名： | 沈洁 潘天群 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京大学哲学系 南京210093 |
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| 摘 要： | “承诺”和“威胁”为动态博弈中的言语活动，博弈中的“承诺’’和“威胁”是人类特殊的言语行为，博弈论给出了可置信的“承诺”和“威胁”的利益条件。本文以“承诺”为例，使用塞尔的言语行为理论，分析作为言语行为的可置信“承诺”必须具备的其他条件。
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| 关 键 词： | 动态博弈 言语行为 承诺 威胁 可置信 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-0262（2008）01-0048-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-11-10 |
Analysis of Speech Acts in Dynamic Games |
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| SHEN Jie,PAN Tian-qun.Analysis of Speech Acts in Dynamic Games[J].Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce,2008,28(1):48-51. |
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| Authors: | SHEN Jie PAN Tian-qun |
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| Institution: | (Department of Philosophy, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093 ,China) |
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| Abstract: | Both "commitments" and "threats" are speech events in dynamic games,while "commitments" and "threats" in games are the special human speech acts.Game theory presents a benefit condition to judge whether a commitment or threat is credible.According to J.Searle's theory of speech acts,the paper tries to analyze all conditions that credible "commitments" in games should meet. |
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| Keywords: | dynamic games speech acts commitment threat credible |
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