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A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Authors:Franç  oise Forges,Enrico Minelli
Affiliation:Françoise Forges,Enrico Minelli
Abstract:We consider two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. The characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs obtained by Hart allows for complex strategies, which are actually required by some equilibrium payoffs in some games. We show that appropriate one-shot public communication mechanisms make Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable by means of simple strategies. Furthermore, these mechanisms satisfy a notion of self-fulfillment.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, C72.
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