| 有限信息与有限实施下的相互保险机制安排 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘家悦,刘丁蓉. 有限信息与有限实施下的相互保险机制安排[J]. 广东商学院学报, 2010, 25(2): 60-66 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘家悦 刘丁蓉 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中南财经政法大学,湖北,武汉,430073
2. 中南财经政法大学,湖北,武汉,430073;广东商学院公共管理学院,广东,广州,510320 |
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| 摘 要： | 相互保险是农村家庭应付不确定性收入波动的非正式制度安排。理论上,标准的相互保险模型表明：在一个农村社区中,对单个家庭所面临的特殊性风险,相互保险机制能够实现风险配置的帕累托最优。然而它忽略了两大限制性因素：有限信息与有限实施。前者表现为逆向选择和道德风险,此时,相互保险机制的实施不是帕累托最优的;后者则源于强制性约束制度的缺乏和高收入家庭的违约激励,此时,相互保险是约束有效的。
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| 关 键 词： | 相互保险机制 不确定性收入 有限信息 有限实施 |
On Mutual Insurance Mechanism Arrangement with Limited Information and Limited Enforcement |
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| LIU Jia-yue,LIU Ding-rong. On Mutual Insurance Mechanism Arrangement with Limited Information and Limited Enforcement[J]. Journal of Guangdong Business College, 2010, 25(2): 60-66 |
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| Authors: | LIU Jia-yue LIU Ding-rong |
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| Affiliation: | LIU Jia-yue,LIU Ding-rong(School of Economics,Zhongnan University of Economics , Law,Wuhan 430073,China,Guangdong University of Business Studies,Guangzhou 510320,China) |
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| Abstract: | Mutual insurance is an informal mechanism arrangement for the rural families to cope with the fluctuations in uncertain income.Theoretically,the standard mutual insurance model shows:in a rural community,it can realize the optimized Pareto risk arrangement for a specific family facing idiosyncratic risks.However,it ignores the two restrictive factors:limited information and limited enforcement.The former is manifested by the adverse selection and moral hazard,incapable of realizing the optimized Pareto for ... |
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| Keywords: | mutual insurance mechanism indeterminate income limited information limited enforcement |
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