Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley–Shubik index |
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Authors: | Annick Laruelle Federico Valenciano |
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Institution: | aUFR Sciences Economiques et Gestion, Université de Caen, Esplanade de la Paix, F-14032 Caen cedex, France;bDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, Universidad del País Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain |
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Abstract: | In this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule. Assuming complete information, we model a variety of bargaining protocols and investigate their stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We show how the Shapley–Shubik index and other power indices can be interpreted as measures of ‘bargaining power’ that appear in this light as limit cases. |
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Keywords: | Bargaining in committees Bargaining power Voting power |
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