农民工职业风险、工伤保险与教育补贴的政策效应

农民工工伤保险和农民工教育补贴新政策引人瞩目。文章考虑两部门(农民工和政府)、两时期(教育投资期和工作期)经济,构造基于职业风险、并纳入新政策变量的效用函数,通过局部均衡和比较静态分析揭示新政策效应。结论表明:“理性选择”是农民工微观行为决策的特征雏型;农民工工伤保险制度实现了高、低风险职业福利的再分配;教育投资提升了社会效率,但均衡是帕累托次优状态;而农民工教育补贴政策的介入,则实现着帕累托改进的动态过程。农民工工伤保险和教育补贴政策的有机搭配,诠释着公平与效率并重的和谐政策艺术,动态支撑着公平与效率的平衡。

Vocational Risks, Industrial Injury Insurance and Education Subsidies for Rural-Workers

The policies about industrial injury insurance and education subsidies for rural-workers have caught the eyes of the public.By the two sector and two period economic model,this paper constructs a utility function in which new policy variables and vocational risks are included.By partial equilibrium and comparative static state analysis,conclusions are as follows:rural-workers' behaviors are characterized by rational choices;welfare has been reallocated among high-risk and low-risk occupations with the help of the industrial injury insurance for rural-workers;education investment has improved the society efficiency,however,the equilibrium is a second-best Pareto state;Pareto improvement is processing when education subsidy enters the utility function as a variable.The organic combination of the policies about industrial injury insurance and education subsidies for rural-workers exhibits the art of harmonious polices,which emphasizes both fairness and efficiency,and simultaneously supports the balance between the two.