Maastricht: New and Old Rules |
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Authors: | Franco Spinelli Carmine Trecroci |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Brescia, Brescia;(2) Department of Economics, University of Brescia, via San Faustino 74/b, 25122 Brescia, Italy |
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Abstract: | Thanks to the Maastricht Treaty and similar arrangements, central banks nowadays enjoy considerable independence. This is
generally believed to be the result of relatively recent debates, which led to the conclusion that sheltering monetary authorities
from the pressures of fiscal policymakers is a prerequisite for monetary stability. However, in history this point has in
fact been a recurrent tenet. We start with David Ricardo’s arguments in favour of central bank independence and against monetisation
of public deficits. After WWI, the latter issue was at the heart of the 1920 International Financial Conference of the League
of Nations, which fostered and guided the establishment of many new central banks, and shaped various policymaking arrangements
of today’s monetary authorities.
JEL Classification Numbers: B12, B22, E42, E58, E61 |
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Keywords: | monetary stability fiscal rules central bank independence |
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