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论公共卫生最优支出策略
引用本文:周桦,刘彬. 论公共卫生最优支出策略[J]. 中央财经大学学报, 2004, 98(5): 14-18
作者姓名:周桦  刘彬
作者单位:中央财经大学 北京100081(周桦),北京大学 北京100871(刘彬)
摘    要:公共卫生支出具有极强的正外部性.如果由地方政府或私人选择公共卫生支出的水平,那么他们的最优选择是较低的公共卫生支出和较高的个人消费(内含个人医疗支出),整个社会的福利将会处于较低的水平状态.本文在一个动态的框架下分析了发生这种现象的经济学原因,说明中央政府而非地方政府或私人应该对公共卫生的建设承担更大的责任,应由中央政府负责全国公共卫生体系的建设.

关 键 词:外部性  公共卫生  社会福利
文章编号:1000-1549(2004)05-0014-05
修稿时间:2004-03-20

Optimal Strategy of Public Health Investment
ZHOU Hua LIU Bin. Optimal Strategy of Public Health Investment[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2004, 98(5): 14-18
Authors:ZHOU Hua LIU Bin
Affiliation:ZHOU Hua LIU Bin
Abstract:There are strong positive externalities in public health expenditure. When local governments or individuals answer for the expenditure of public health, the expenditure of public health in equilibrium will be lower, the private consumption including individual health care expenditure will be higher, and consequently the level of social welfare will be lower. This paper studies the problem in a dynamic framework, and demonstrates that it is the central government, instead of local governments or individuals, that should be responsible for constructing a statewide public health system.
Keywords:Externalities Public health Social welfare  
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