政府采购监督制度优化的博弈分析

在政府采购监督博弈中,监督的博弈规则有效与否,主要取决于作为规则制定者——法规制定部门的评价,所以,应重视对政府采购监督者的监督,加大对监督主体查治工作的奖励和对其不作为的惩罚,提高查治工作的积极性,避免监督主体与监督客体串谋。政府采购监督客体的行为取决于预期正效用与受处罚的负效用的权衡,所以,应掌握好查治概率和处罚程度。

Game Analysis on Optimizing the Supervision Institution of Government Procurement

The validity of Games on supervision institution does not depend mainly upon judgments of bi-participants in the game.The supervision of the government procurement supervisors should be emphasized,and more rewards and punishment measurements should be brought into effect to promote their activities and to avoid their conspiracy.The behaviors of objectives of government procurement supervision lie on the tradeoff between prospective positive utilities and the punished negative utilities.The probability and severity of punishment should be made into consideration together.