基于演化博弈的消费金融资产证券化与激励型监管关系研究

2020年11月央行与银保监会联合印发《网络小额贷款业务管理暂行办法(征求意见稿)》对消费金融资产证券化规模做出明确限制,如何有效治理消费金融公司的违规行为成为金融监管领域的核心议题。本文基于演化博弈理论,将激励机制纳入分析框架,研究消费金融公司与监管机构在动态博弈中的策略选择并借助理论建模分析二者演化博弈均衡问题。研究结果表明:消费金融公司与监管机构策略选择的外部性,隐含了演化稳定策略的存在性;消费金融公司与监管机构的利益不一致,使得博弈系统可能存在不稳定状态;博弈系统是否存在稳定组合策略取决于监管成本与社会损失的相对大小以及违规发行超额获利与违规处罚和合规激励之和的相对大小。

Research on the Relationship between Consumer Financial Asset Securitization and Incentive Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game

In November 2020,The People's Bank of China(PBC)andChina Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission(CBRC)jointly issued theto clearly limit the scale of consumer financial asset securitization,and how to effectively control the violations of consumer finance companies has become core issue in financial regulatory field.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper incorporates the incentivemechanism into the analysis framework,studies the strategic choices of consumer finance companies and regulatory agencies in the dynamic gameand analyzes the equilibrium of the evolutionary game between consumer finance companies and regulatory agenciesby theoretical modeling.The research results show that:the externality of the strategic choices of consumer finance companies and regulatory agencies implies the existence of evolutionary stability strategies;the interests of consumer finance companies and regulatory agencies are inconsistent,making the game system may be unstable;whether there is a stable combination strategy in the game system depends on the relative size of regulatory costs and social losses,as well as the relative size of the excess profits by illegal means and the sum of illegal penalties and compliance incentives.