“店选网购”的竞争效应及其反垄断政策涵义

随着互联网和电子商务的发展,消费者在店商试选后以较低价格从网商购买商品的“店选网购”现象非常普遍,厂商或店商经常以其存在搭便车问题为由采取维持转售价格予以限制。本文通过构建具有横向差异化的霍特林模型,考察“店选网购”的竞争效应。研究表明,尽管“店选网购”存在搭便车问题,却能促进店商与网商间的竞争,降低店商和网商的价格和利润,使消费者从中获益,但对社会福利的影响结果是不明确的;其反垄断政策涵义是,“店选网购”具有促进竞争和存在搭便车问题的双重特性,不能简单地作为豁免维持转售价格的正当理由,而应根据实际情况具体分析。

Competition Effects of Showrooming and Its Anti Monopoly Policy Implications

With the development of the internet and e commerce,the showrooming phenomenon that consumers buy goods from web stores at a lower price after selection by bricks and mortar stores becomes common.Manufacturers or bricks and mortar stores often use the resale price maintenance(RPM)to restrict competition because of the free rider problem of showrooming.This paper studies the competitive effects of showrooming by constructing a Hotelling model with horizontal differentiation.The conclusions show that although there are free rider problems,showrooming could promote competition between bricks and mortar stores and web stores,reduce the prices and profits of bricks and mortar stores and web stores,and increase consumer surplus,while the impact on social welfare mainly depends on the service cost of the bricks and mortar stores.Its anti monopoly policy implications are that showrooming has the dual characteristics of promoting competition and free rider problems,and cannot simply be used as a valid reason for exempting RPM,while anti monopoly law enforcement should be exempted as appropriate based on the cost of services and the social welfare impact of showrooming.