管理防御对上市公司资本结构的影响

在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下,自利管理者与股东之间的利益冲突引发管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为。从影响管理防御的管理者特征、管理者激励和管理者监督三个方面选择了7个因素,利用深、沪两市上市公司2001-2007年3804个样本,实证分析了管理防御影响因素对资本结构的影响。研究发现:在没有外部威胁的情况下防御的管理者偏好低负债,国有控制样本和非国有样本管理防御对资本结构影响存在一定差异。

Empirical Analysis of the Influence of Managerial Entrenchment on Capital Structure of Listed Company

Under the circumstances of information asymmetry and incomplete contract,the interest conflicts between self-benefit managers and shareholders,and the managerial entrenchment behavior,through which the managers strengthen their position and concentrate on perusing their own utility,is inspired.This thesis selects seven factors from the aspects of manager's characteristics,management incentive and management restraint,and empirically analyzes the influence of managerial entrenchment behavior on capital structure using the samples of 3804 listed companies from 2001 to 2007 in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange.The Study finds that in the case of absence of external threats,the defense managers prefer low debt,and there are some differences between state control samples and non-state con-trol ones.