R&D competition, absorptive capacity, and market shares |
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Authors: | Domenico Campisi Paolo Mancuso Alberto Nastasi |
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Institution: | (1) Present address: Dipartimento di Informatica, Sistemi e Produzione, Università degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata”, Via di Tor Vergata 110, I-00133 Roma, Italy;(2) Present address: Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica, Università degli Studie di Roma “La Sapienza”, Via Buonarroti 12, I-00185 Roma, Italy |
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Abstract: | This paper deals with an oligopolistic industry where firms are engaged in cost-reducting R&D activity to maximize their market
shares. The existence and uniqueness of a feedback-Nash-optimal R&D strategy for each firm are discussed. Our simulations
highlight that variations in spillovers hardly influence the firms' R&D investment, if their absorptive capacities to exploit
extramural knowledge depend on their R&D efforts. Moreover, extramural knowledge cannot completely replace in-house R&D. However,
a high level of public R&D favors the firm with the most restrictive R&D expenditure constraint and/or with the lowest initial
R&D stock, provided it invests in R&D. |
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Keywords: | cost-reducing R& D stock of technological knowledge extra-industry R& D dynamic noncooperative feedback game |
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