No Show Paradox in Condorcet <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-voting Procedures |
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Authors: | Joaquín Pérez José L Jimeno Estefanía García |
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Institution: | 1.Departamento de Fundamentos de Economía e Historia Económica,Universidad de Alcalá,Alcalá de Henares, Madrid,Spain |
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Abstract: | In this paper we extend the negative known results about No Show Paradox in Condorcet voting functions and correspondences
to the contexts of k-functions and k-correspondences, in which the outcome of the voting process is a unique k-committee (set of k candidates) or a family of k-committees. The main result of the paper states that for every Condorcet k-function and for every Condorcet k-correspondence, there are situations in which every optimistic or pessimistic voter with some specific preferences could
manipulate the election by abstaining. |
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