Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination |
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Authors: | Sade Orly; Schnitzlein Charles; Zender Jaime F |
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Institution: | Jerusalem School of Business, Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
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Abstract: | An experimental approach is used to examine the performanceof three different multiunit auction designs: discriminatory,uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenoussupply. We find the actual strategies to be inconsistent withtheoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatoryauction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than eitheruniform-price auction and so, contrary to theoretical predictionsand previous experimental results, it generates the lowest averagerevenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the actualbid schedules are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatorypricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply. |
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