价值创造还是价值攫取:美国企业股东治理模式的困境与启示

美国现行企业治理模式失灵是其经济难以真正复苏的主要原因之一。外部大股东介入公司运营非但没有带来理想中的效率提升,反而干扰了管理层的正常决策,加重了对劳动者的盘剥。金融资本家大肆攫取公司资源,严重损害了企业的创新能力。股东治理模式误解了股东与经理人的经济关系,高估了股东投资对于企业经营的重要性,错把股东视为唯一的风险投资者与关键的创新推动者。此外在分析时所采用的同质化抽象处理也不利于普通股东。股东至上的观念本质上属于资本主义生产方式的必然产物,倾向于大股东的利润分配方案根植于以交换为核心的新古典经济学,不能据此来指导企业经营。我国下阶段的公司改革需要以适合我国国情的、专注于提升企业生产创新能力的新型公司治理理论为指导。

Value Creation or Value Extraction: Dilemmas and Enlightenments of AmericanCorporate Shareholder Governance

The failure of current corporate governance in the United States is one of the main reasons for its difficult economic recovery.Instead of bringing in the desired efficiency gains,the involvement of large external shareholders in corporate operations interferes with the correct management decisions and aggravates the exploitation of workers.Financial capitalists grab company’s resources,seriously damaging the innovation ability of corporates.Shareholder governance misunderstands the economic relationships between shareholders and managers,overestimates the importance of shareholders’investment in business operation,and mistakes shareholders as the only venture investors and key innovation promoters.In addition,homogeneity assumption analysis method is not conducive to the common public shareholders.In essence,shareholder perspective is the inevitable outcome of capitalist mode of production.The profit sharing schemes inclined to large shareholders is based on neoclassical economics with exchange as the core,which cannot guide the operation of corporates.The next stage of corporate reform in China should be guided by a new corporate governance theory which is suitable for our national conditions and focuses on improving the production and innovation capacity of corporates.