| 基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 钱春海,韩燕.基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析[J].财经研究,2007,33(8):17-27,107. |
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| 作者姓名： | 钱春海 韩燕 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国浦东干部学院,现代产业与金融研究所,上海,201204;中国浦东干部学院,现代产业与金融研究所,上海,201204 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章在贸易主体间成本信息缺失的基础上,重新探讨了VER的政策含义。研究结果发现,在本国对外国厂商成本信息缺失的情境下,若产品市场为Cournot竞争,则VER将对两国产生实质的影响:对出口国而言,不论其厂商为何种类型,此时的VER政策都是非自愿的;本国的福利变化则需视出口厂商的类型而定。而在Bertrand竞争下,VER只在出口厂商为高成本类型时方对出口国有利,且不论外国厂商为何种类型,VER皆无法使两国同时获利。
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| 关 键 词： | 自动出口限制 不完全信息 福利分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-9952（2007）08-0017-12 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-05-17 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-05-17 |
The Analysis of VER Policy and Optimal Social Welfare Based on Lack of Information for Production Cost |
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| QIAN Chun-hai,HAN Yan.The Analysis of VER Policy and Optimal Social Welfare Based on Lack of Information for Production Cost[J].The Study of Finance and Economics,2007,33(8):17-27,107. |
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| Authors: | QIAN Chun-hai HAN Yan |
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| Institution: | Modern Industry and Finance Centre, China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong , Shanghai 201204, China |
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| Abstract: | The policy implications of voluntary export restraints are examined under incomplete information.The results show that when firms engage in Cournot competition under incomplete information of foreign technologies,voluntary export restraints are involuntary for the exporting country,while domestic welfare will depend on the type of foreign firms.Under Bertrand competition,voluntary export restraints are voluntary for the exporting country when its firm is of a high cost type,however,they cannot increase the welfare of both countries. |
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| Keywords: | voluntary export restraints(VER) incomplete information welfare analysis |
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