The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences |
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Authors: | Matthew O Jackson Antonio Nicolò |
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Institution: | a Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA b Department of Economics, University of Padova, via del Santo 33, 35123, Padova, Italy |
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Abstract: | We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care about the number of other consumers. We show that strategy-proof and efficient social choice functions satisfying an outsider independence condition must always assign a fixed number of consumers, regardless of individual desires to participate. A hierarchical rule selects participants and a generalized median rule selects the level of the public good. Under heterogeneity in agents’ views on the optimal number of consumers, strategy-proof, efficient, and outsider independent social choice functions are much more limited and in an important case must be dictatorial. |
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Keywords: | D62 H23 |
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