委托-代理关系下的最优契约——契约补偿、私人利得与股东保护间的均衡

传统公司治理都和股东与管理者间的利益冲突有关。以股权分离学说为基础的代理理论认为管理者倾向于自身效用最大化而不是股东价值最大化。文中拟运用具体的分析框架,从研究道德风险和逆向选择的代理问题入手,来重新审视关于价值转移的争论。

The Optimal Contract within Principal-Agent Framework——the Equilibrium Among the Compensation Contracts, Primate Benefits and Protection of Shareholders

The literature on corporate governance traditionally deals with the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. The quintessential agency theory based on the separation of ownership and control considers the managers may make decisions that maximize their own utility but fail to maximize shareholder value. The following paper would use the analyse framework to re-examine the debate about the value diversion through the moral hazard and adverse selection.