The effect of auditor litigation risk on clients' access to bank debt: Evidence from a quasi-experiment |
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Authors: | Mahfuz Chy Gus De Franco Barbara Su |
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Affiliation: | 1. Trulaske College of Business, University of Missouri, USA;2. A.B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University, USA;3. Fox School of Business, Temple University, USA |
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Abstract: | We exploit staggered state-level shocks to third-party auditor legal liability in the U.S. to test whether auditor litigation risk affects client companies' access to private debt markets. We find that an exogenous increase in auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in both clients' likelihood of receiving bank loans and the average amount of the bank loans that clients receive. In support of our proposed mechanism that auditor litigation risk leads to improvements in clients' audit and financial reporting quality, we find that these same shocks lead to a reduction in accruals, an increase in going-concern opinions, a decrease in restatements, and an improvement in accruals' ability to predict future cash flows. We also find that increased auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in the contractibility of clients’ accounting numbers, as proxied by the use of debt covenants, and a decrease in the cost of borrowing. |
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Keywords: | Debt financing Auditor litigation risk State liability laws |
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