Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia |
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Authors: | Guriev Sergei Makarov Igor Maurel Mathilde |
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Affiliation: | a New Economic School, CEFIR, CEPR, and WDI, Nakhimovsky pr. 47, Moscow, 117418, Russiaf1;b Sloan School of Management, M.I.T. 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02142, f2;c ROSES–CNRS and CEPR, Maison des Sciences économiques, 106–112 Bd de l'Hôpital, Paris Cedex 13, 75647, Francef3 |
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Abstract: | This paper develops a model in which costly barter is used by firms to protect working capital against outside creditors. Although creditors could agree to postpone debt payments and to avoid destroying the firm's working capital, if the firm cannot commit not to divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater is the debt overhang, the more likely is the use of barter, with and without the possibility of debt restructuring. Empirical evidence from Russian firm-level data is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 635–656. New Economic School, CEFIR, CEPR, and WDI, Nakhimovsky pr. 47, Moscow 117418, Russia; Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142; and ROSES–CNRS and CEPR, Maison des Sciences économiques, 106–112 Bd de l'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E41, G34, P31. |
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