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Product Liability and Strategic Delegation: Endogenous Manager Incentives Promote Strict Liability |
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| Authors: | Friehe Tim Pham Cat Lam Miceli Thomas J |
| Institution: | 1.Public Economics Group, University of Marburg, Am Plan 2, 35037, Marburg, Germany ;2.CESifo, Munich, Germany ;3.EconomiX, Paris, France ;4.Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, 309 Oak Hall, 365 Fairfield Way, Storrs, CT, 06269-1063, USA ; |
| Abstract: | Review of Industrial Organization - We derive the socially optimal allocation of liability for product-related accidents when firms delegate their output and safety choices to managers under a... |
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