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Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines |
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| Authors: | Wayne-Roy Gayle Robert C Marshall Leslie M Marx Jean-Fran?ois Richard |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Monroe Hall, PO Box 400182, Charlottesville, VA, 22904-4182, USA 2. Department of Economics, Penn State University, 613 Kern Graduate Building, University Park, PA, 16802, USA 3. Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Box 90120, Durham, NC, 27708-0120, USA 4. Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 4917, Wesley W. Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260, USA |
| Abstract: | Recent research has highlighted the quantitative contribution to merger analysis from extending unilateral effects models to understand the payoffs to future potential coordinated effects. Some of the emphasis of this research appears to have made its way into the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In this paper, we demonstrate the quantification of coordinated effects in an oligopoly and procurement model, and we show that screens that are based on upward pricing pressure are not adequate in mergers where coordinated effects are a potential concern. |
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