控制权性质、管理层持股与公司治理效率

本文结合国情对我国上市公司控制权性质与管理层持股的关系对公司治理效率的影响进行了实证研究。结果显示,无论是国有控股上市公司,还是非国有控股上市公司,管理层持股作为一种激励机制,在公司有效治理中发挥了一定的积极作用,且二者在形式上均与反映公司治理效率的变量Tobin’Q值呈现出倒U型的曲线关系。所不同的是,由于受控制权性质的影响,国有控股上市公司管理层最优持股比例(55.78%)远大于非国有控股上市公司管理层最优持股比例(14.57%)。说明为了调动国有控股上市公司高层的积极性,国家须为此付出很高的代价,包括公司控制权的丧失。倒U型的曲线关系的存在,也表明管理层持股作为一种激励制度,仅在一定范围内有效。另外,利益趋同效应与掘壕自守效应的存在,使与股权激励机制相配套的约束机制成为必要。

The Relationship between Attribute of Control Rights and Shareholdings of Managers and the Governance Efficiency of Chinese Listed Companies

This paper examines the relationship between attribute of control rights and shareholdings of managers, and governance efficiency of the listed companies. The result of study shows that attribute of the control rights of China's listed companies has an important effect on shareholdings of managers. On this basis, Regression results using 1002 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed company observations in 2003 show that, as an incentive mechanism, shareholdings of managers play an active role in corporate governance. However, there are some defects in our manager's shareholding system, especially for state-owned companies. Finally, we put forward some suggestion about it.